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The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618, No. 1, 168-179 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0002716208316732

The Conundrum of Iran: Strengthening Moderates without Acquiescing to Belligerence

John Brennan

After nearly three decades of antagonistic rhetoric and diplomatic estrangement between the United States and Iran, the next president has the opportunity to set a new course for relations between the two countries. When the next president takes up residence at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Iranian officials will be listening. The president must implement a policy of engagement that encourages moderates in Iran without implying tolerance for Tehran's historic support of terrorist activities. This strategy will require patience and sensitivity to the complex political realities inside Iran. To successfully chart a new course for U.S.-Iranian relations, the next president must (1) tone down rhetoric; (2) establish a direct dialogue with Tehran, including comprehensive, private discussions and deployment of a special envoy; (3) encourage greater assimilation of Hezbollah into Lebanon's political system; and (4) offer carrots in addition to sticks, including consideration of legitimate Iranian concerns on regional security issues.

Key Words: Iran • Hezbollah • United States • state-sponsored terrorism • Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps • IRGC • Shia Islam

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This Article
Right arrow Abstract Freely available
Right arrow Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
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Right arrow Email this article to a friend
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Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
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Right arrow Articles by Brennan, J.
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