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Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University

Traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe. Preventive strategies, which call for the elimination of an enemy before it is able to attack, are highly risky and often difficult to implement. The United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.

Key Words: expanded deterrence • preventive war • nuclear weapons • North Korea • Iran • Pakistan • Russia • al Qaeda • terrorism

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1, 51-58 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0002716206290457


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