This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Hamilton, M. A. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism

New York University School of Law

The Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions that turn on the Constitution's inherent principles of federalism, decisions that have alarmed many a legal scholar. The Court has been attacked for overstepping its bounds and, by some, on the grounds that the federalism-state balance should be maintained through the political process rather than judicial review. This criticism of the judicial enforcement of federalism fails as a matter of constitutional history and on empirical grounds. The Supreme Court in this era deserves praise, not criticism, for its recent federalism jurisprudence.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 574, No. 1, 93-103 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/000271620157400107


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?