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Crimes Against the Environment: Superfund Enforcement at Last

The success of the Superfund program rests substantially on the ability of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to induce major corporations to share in the cost of a multibillion-dollar hazardous waste site cleanup effort. Over the past decade, EPA enforcement strategy has evolved from highly accommodative to much more enforcement oriented. Reports also indicate a substantial increase in application of Superfund's most powerful enforcement tools. Industrial targets of EPA enforcement are attempting to shift partial liability and transaction costs onto third parties. Viewed against the economic and political evolution of EPA strategy, a continuation of the enforcement-first approach depends on the willingness of society to accept the costs of sanctioning the powerful.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 525, No. 1, 119-133 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0002716293525001010


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