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The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
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Terror, the Strategic Tool: Response and Control

ROBERT H. KUPPERMAN

Debra Van Opstal

David Williamson, Jr.

The United States appears ill prepared to deal with an emerging form of interstate rivalry, that is, the use of terror as an unconventional weapon to achieve conventional political ends. The terror event represents a powerful form of leverage simply because of its media value. Using media coverage to amplify their impact, acts of terrorist violence have paralyzed Western governments and undermined their credibility. In a destabilized international environment, the vectored terrorist threat offers additional advantages to radical nations or superpowers in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Under the guise of criminality, it can become a low-cost, low-risk, high-leverage tool of low-intensity warfare, difficult to combat because uncertainty about the origin of the threat limits the full range of diplomatic and military responses.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 463, No. 1, 24-38 (1982)
DOI: 10.1177/0002716282463001003


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R. H. KUPPERMAN and D. van Opstal
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[Abstract]