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The Unsolved German SettlementClaremont Graduate School and University Center Three realities of the German situation must be accepted in any peaceful settlement of the short-run aspects: the division of Germany into two separate states, the rearma ment of Germany, and the division of Berlin with continued presence of Western troops in West Berlin. The main dispute is over recognition of East Germany, since the Soviet and United States proposals on Berlin are close enough to be negotiable— Soviet proposals have not called for elimination of Western gar risons. The major American concern over recognition involves the West German reaction, with its possible effect on NATO. West Germany, the mainstay of the alliance, also refuses to ac cept East Germany and its frontiers, insisting that a reuni fied Germany embracing 193 7 frontiers can be achieved by a "policy of strength in NATO." In considering whether the military risks of making a German settlement outweigh the military risks of not making one, major questions are (1) whether there exists a threat of Soviet military aggression against Western Europe and (2) whether NATO can long con tinue in its present form in any event. Although West Ger many will doubtless have closer relations with the Soviet Union in the future, a "deal" involving the sacrifice of East Germany by Moscow is no longer likely. Whether a West German-So viet rapprochement will prove deleterious to the United States depends in large part on whether the United States and the Soviet Union can reach a détente before it occurs.
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 351, No. 1,
148-156 (1964) |
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